I. INTRODUCTION In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court, for the first time, established standards for determining whether a defense attorney's performance denied a defendant the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 2 The Court held that a defendant must overcome two separate burdens to establish a claim of ineffective assistance. 3 First, a defendant must show that counsel acted "unreasonably" as measured by the prevailing norms of the profession. 4 Second, a defendant must show that counsel's incompetent assistance prejudiced the defense by rendering the proceeding fundamentally unfair. 5 The Court stated that the defendant need not prove that counsel's unreasonable conduct likely affected the outcome of the case; the defendant need prove only that the incompetent assistance created a reasonable probability that, but for 758 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 75
circumstances." 22 Defense counsel did not cross-examine the state's medical experts, who testified about the manner of death of respondent's victims. 23 The trial judge found several aggravating factors 2 4 with regard to each of the three murders. 2 5 He did not find any significant mitigating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating factors. 26 He sentenced Washington to death on each of the three counts, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld the sentences on direct appeal. 24 In Florida, the sentencer is directed to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether to impose the death sentence. FLA. STAT The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Id. at § 921.145(6). 25 104 S. Ct. at 2057-58. The judge found that all three murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, were committed in the course of at least one other dangerous and violent felony, for pecuniary gain, to avoid arrest for accompanying crimes, and to hinder law enforcement. Id. at 2058. 26 Id. at 2058. Washington's alleged lack of criminal history was offset by the fact that he admitted he had "engaged in a course of stealing" during the murder spree. The judge found that Washington could appreciate the criminality of his acts. He also held that Washington's relative youth (26 years) was not a mitigating factor because he had planned the crimes and had disposed of the proceeds from the thefts. 
III. DISPOSITION OF APPEAL
Washington sought collateral relief in state court, asserting that his defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing proceeding. 28 The trial court denied relief, finding that the evidence conclusively showed that the claim of ineffective assistance was without merit. 2 9 The trial court concluded that Washington "had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding." 3 0 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. 31 That court concluded that Washington had not made out a prima facie case of substantial deficiency or possible prejudice.
32
After exhausting his appeals in the state courts, Washington filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 33 The 28 104 S. Ct. at 2058. Washington asserted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to (1) move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing; (2) request a psychiatric report; (3) investigate and present character witnesses; (4). seek a presentence investigation report; (5) present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge; and (6) investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts. Id.
29 Id. The trial court held that the ineffective assistance claim was meritless because there was no ground for counsel to request a continuance, the admission of a presentence report would have undermined Washington's assertion of no criminal history, counsel's argument at sentencing hearing was "admirable," counsel's failure to cross-examine the medical witnesses was not error, counsel's failure to order a psychiatric examination was not prejudicial error because there was no indication of major mental illness at the time of the crimes, and counsel's failure to develop and present character witnesses was not prejudicial error. (1) a specific omission or overt act by counsel upon which the claim is based; (2) that the act was a "substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel"; and (3) that the deficiency was "substantial enough to demonstrate a prejudice to the defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct affected the outcome of the court proceedings." Id. at 1000-01. Finally, if defendant meets this burden, (4) the state can rebut the presumption of ineffective assistance by showing "beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice in fact." Id. at 1001.
Interestingly, the Knight court recognized that in applying the standard of reasonableness, "death penalty cases are different, and consequently the performance of counsel must be judged in light of these circumstances." Id. federal district court concluded that, although trial counsel had erred by failing to further investigate mitigating evidence, Washington's defense was not prejudiced as a result of this error. 34 The court reiterated that there was not a significant possibility that any of counsel's errors affected the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. 35 Thus, the court denied the petition.
3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for new factfinding. 3 7 The Eleventh Circuit, en banc, developed its own standards for considering ineffective assistance claims. 38 The court of appeals stated that the sixth amendment requires reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances. 39 This standard imposes on counsel a duty to investigate. 40 Although it need not be exhaustive, the investigation must include an independent examination of the relevant facts, circumstances, pleadings, and laws. 4 ' If many defenses are available, the court of appeals usually will respect counsel's objective strategic decision to forego some investigation in favor of another. 4 2 This deference to strategic choices is related to the reasonableness of counsel's judgments on which the choices are based. 4 3 When counsel's strategy represents a reasonable choice of defense, based upon reasonable assumptions, counsel need not investigate defenses that he or she will not employ at trial.
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The court of appeals further noted that where the prosecution is not directly responsible for the deficient performance by counsel, 45 the defendant must show that counsel's errors "resulted in 34 Id. actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense." '4 6 A majority of the en banc court of appeals agreed to remand the case to apply the newly announced standards.
7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the standards by which to judge a claim that defense counsel's specific errors undermined defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 4 8 IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court 49 ruled that a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient representation prejudiced the defense. 50 Thus, the defendant must prove that counsel's representation was unreasonable under professional norms and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 5 1 The Court rejected the notion that the defendant's burden should be less in cases involving the death penalty. Furthermore, the Court established a strong presumption in ineffective assistance claims that counsel's performance falls within the realm of reasonable professional assistance. 53 The Court maintained that its holding did not establish mechanical rules, but rather interference in the representation process, or of inherently prejudicial conflict of interest," the Supreme Court has held that a special showing of prejudice is unnecessary to reverse ajudgment because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing Washington, 693 F.2d at 1258-59). See also infra note 161. 46 693 F.2d at 1262. The court of appeals reasoned that this standard would discourage insubstantial claims by requiring more than a showing, which could virtually always be made, of some conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors. Id at 1260-62. Though the appellate court did not require the defendant to prove that the errors actually affected the outcome of the proceeding, "even if the defense suffered actual and substantial disadvantage, the state may show in the context of all the evidence that it remains certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the proceedings would not have been altered but for the ineffectiveness of counsel." Id. at 1262 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). operated as a guide for the decision process. 5 4 It stressed that a court's ultimate focus must be on the fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding. 55 Applying its new standard, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that Washington's defense was the result of reasonable professional judgment and that there was no reasonable probability that any errors could have affected the outcome of the sentencing hearing. 5 6 The Court noted that no prior Supreme Court decision had directly addressed a claim of counsel's actual ineffective assistance in a case at trial. 5 7 Because the Court had not squarely decided the proper standard for ineffective assistance, lower courts have adopted varying tests with respect to the standard of prejudice that a defendant must show in an ineffective assistance claim. 58 The Court granted certiorari to clarify the proper standard. 59 The Court held that the defendant must overcome two distinct burdens to succeed with an ineffective assistance claim. The first prong of the Strickland v. Washington test requires that the defendant show that counsel's performance was inadequate. 60 In short, the defendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." The Court considered more specific guidelines to be "not appropriate." Id. The sixth amendment implicitly relies on the "legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the reasonableness of counsel's conduct by looking at the facts of the case, 62 viewed at the time of counsel's conduct. 63 The defendant must identify counsel's acts or omissions that constitute an unreasonable professional judgment. 6 4 In light of all the circumstances, the court must determine whether the identified acts or omissions fell beyond the broad range of professionally competent assistance. 65 In making this determination, a court's scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. 6 6 Because of the difficulties of fairly evaluating counsel's performance with hindsight, the court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct was within the range of reasonable professional assistance." 67 Proof of an unreasonable error under professional norms will not, in itself, require reversal of a conviction. 68 The second prong of the Strickland v. Washington test requires that any deficiencies in counsel's performance must prejudice the defense. 69 The defendant has the burden of proving prejudice in most claims of ineffective assistance. 70 The Court reasoned that attorney errors come in many forms and are as likely to be harmless as prejudicial in any particular case. 71 62 Id. at 2065. The Court noted that "the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. The Court refused to prescribe a set of rigid rules that would define counsel duties in all cases. Though the Court recognized several duties that counsel always owes the defendant, it elected not to stultify the independence of counsel, but rather, to grant counsel "wide latitude ... in making tactical decisions." Id. 63 Id. at 2066. The Court stressed that a court should be reluctant to second guess counsel's strategic decisions with its benefit of hindsight. Justice O'Connor wrote that "every effort [must) be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, .. and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 2065. 64 Id. at 2066. 70 Id In some cases prejudice is presumed. These include the "actual or constructive denial of assistance altogether . same act or omission can have different consequences depending on the circumstances, the defendant must show that the alleged errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense.
The Court chose a stricter standard for prejudice than that offered by the respondent Washington, but less burdensome than that requested by the United States as amicus curiae. 7 3 The defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ' 74 The Court defined reasonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment. 75 Applying this standard to cases challenging a death sentence, the Court stated that the "question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." 76 A court hearing the ineffective assistance claim must consider all the evidence in front of the sentencer. 77 The Court noted that a verdict weakly supported by the evidence is more likely affected by counsel's errors than a verdict 72 Id. 73 Id. at 2068. Respondent argued that prejudice should be found when the errors "impaired the presentation of the defense." Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 58, Washington). The Court stated that this standard "provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding." Id. The Court also rejected the proposal by the United States that "counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case." Id. The Court stated that this standard, which is applied to newly discovered evidence, was too high for claims alleging ineffective assistance. The Court reasoned that an "ineffective assistance claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker" than in a claim that presupposes that all the essential elements of a fair proceeding are present. Id. The Court concluded that the "result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable ... even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." Id. The Court provided lower tribunals with practical considerations for the overall application of the two-tiered test. 79 First, the test does not establish mechanical rules; courts must focus on the fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding. 8 0 Second, a court must determine whether a breakdown in the adversarial process produced unreliable results in the challenged proceeding. Finally, an ineffectiveness claim is essentially a challenge to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.
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The Court explained how the ineffective assistance claim should affect the criminal justice system as a whole. The standards should not be applied so as to encourage ineffective assistance claims. 8 3 Counsel's willingness to serve must not be adversely affected. 8 4 The independence of counsel should not be impaired, and the trust between attorney and client should be preserved. 8 The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to one's crimes were well known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances were utterly overwhelming. Trial counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help. . . . Restricting testimony on respondent's character to what had come in at the plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent's criminal history, which counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in. Id. Thus, counsel's defense, "though unsuccessful, was the result of reasonable professional judgment." Id. 
1984]
reasoned that "[g]iven the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances . ... -91 Thus, defendant failed twice by showing neither deficient performance nor sufficient prejudice. 9 2 In the broad analysis, the Court found no showing that counsel's alleged deficient assistance caused a breakdown in the adversarial process, thus rendering the sentence unreliable. 93 The Court concluded that Washington's sentencing proceeding was fundamentally fair. 94 Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's opinion but dissented from its judgment because, in his view, the death penalty is in all instances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 9 5 Justice Brennan would have vacated Washington's sentence of death and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that defendants claiming ineffective assistance must show that counsel's performance was inadequate and that the defense was prejudiced thereby. 9 7 He disagreed, however, in the application of the standards in a capital sentencing hearing. 9 8 Justice Brennan noted that, because the consequences of error are so great in capital cases, the Court has "consistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding." 9 9 Justice Brennan believed it essential that the factfinder, upon sentencing in a capital case, consider all possi-91 Id. The Court explained that the evidence counsel chose not to offer "would barely have altered the sentencing profile .... ." Id. Numerous people would have testified that respondent was "generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the level of extreme disturbance." Id. The Court further asserted that the admission of evidence defendant wanted to offer may even have harmed rather than helped his case.
Id.
92 Id. 93 Id. The Court stated that the "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 2064. 94 Id. at 2071. The Court stated that the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the sixth amendment is "simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." Id. at 2065. 95 Id. at 2071-72 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 96 Id. at 2072 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall dissented from both the opinion and the judgment of the Court. 1 0 4 Justice Marshall argued that the Court erred in establishing a performance standard of "simple" reasonableness.' 0 5 Furthermore, he asserted that the majority erred in establishing its standard for prejudice. Justice Marshall claimed that the majority's performance standard of reasonableness is so "malleable" and ambiguous that it provides no guidance to lawyers and lower courtjudges. 10 7 The dissent asserted that many aspects of the criminal defense attorney's duties could be made the subject of uniform standards.' 0 8 He contended that the Court should have developed particularized standards to ensure that defense counsel renders effective legal assistance. 10 9
The dissent also objected to the Court's prejudice standard. Justice Marshall argued that estimating prejudice caused by incompetent counsel is too difficult. 1 10 Not only is it difficult to imagine how competent counsel would have handled the case, but any evidence of prejudice to the defendant may not be reflected in the record because of the unreasonable actions of defense counsel. Despite his objections to the prejudice requirement, Justice Marshall assumed that a showing of prejudice would be required and suggested an appropriate standard for prejudice. If a defendant burdened with incompetent counsel can "establish a significant chance that the outcome would have been different"-rather than reasonable probability-the defendant should be entitled to a new sentencing hearing.'
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The dissent also attacked the majority's suggestion that lower courts should strongly presume that defense counsel's conduct was constitutionally acceptable. 1 15 Though Justice Marshall believed that defendants have the burden of proof in claims of ineffective assistance, he argued that a strong presumption imposes an unusually heavy burden on defendants."l 6 He asserted that holding counsel to prevailing professional norms grants counsel sufficient flexibility to respond to problems at trial."1 7 Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's speculation that a lesser presumption would encourage frivolous suits and clog the courts."" He argued that courts are capable of disposing of meritless claims without presuming that the defendant's claim is insubstantial." 9 Finally, Justice Marshall attacked the majority's notion that counsel's duties at a capital sentencing hearing do not differ from those at an ordinary trial.' 20 LikeJustice Brennan, the dissent wrote that "the standards for determining what constitutes 'effective assistance' [must] be applied especially stringently in capital sentence proceedings."' 12 '
In applying these alternative standards to the facts, Justice Marshall concluded that Washington received constitutionally inadequate representation, and thus, was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding. 1 2 2 Justice Marshall contended that counsel made "virtually no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony... to counteract the impression conveyed by the trial that [Washington] was little more than a cold-blooded killer." 123 He argued that evidence of defendant's family and social connections is crucial in a sentencing hearing, and defense counsel's failure to make a significant effort to determine what evidence might be gained from Washington's relatives and acquaintances cannot be considered "reasonable.' ' 124 Becausejuries often show mercy when exposed to facets of defendant's personality and life, Justice Marshall concluded that counsel's failure to investigate and present such evidence foreclosed a "significant chance" that Washington would have received a life sentence. 125 Counsel's unreasonable failure to investigate, combined with the significant chance of a different outcome at the sentencing hearing, established a violation of Washington's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Although it did not embrace the standard most burdensome to the defendant, 128 the Court imposed requirements that will make it unlikely that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance will succeed. 1 29 The Court's imposition of dual burdens upon defendants facing the death penalty is disturbing. The Court has expressed its preference for limiting appeals and preserving verdicts at the expense of protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.' 3 0
A. THE REASONABLENESS COMPONENT
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington adopted the reasonableness standard after balancing its strengths and weaknesses. Though a reasonableness standard may be appropriate in certain criminal cases, the Court could have strengthened the effectiveness of such a standard by requiring judges to review the adequacy of counsel's performance before the trial or sentencing hearing. The reasonableness standard, however, is not appropriate in capital sentencing hearings. By recognizing the differences between trials and capital sentencing hearings, the Court could have avoided applying the reasonableness standard to sentencing hearings. The Court instead could have developed concrete standards to guide and evaluate attorney conduct during capital sentencing hearings.
Persons claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel acted "unreasonably" as measured by the prevailing standards of the profession.' 3 ' This open-ended standard has its strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it provides attorneys with flexibility to try cases with regard to the relevant facts at hand. Because cases are so varied in nature, forcing lawyers to take specific steps in every case might be wasteful and debilitating. Furthermore, judges may have difficulty in applying rules to such a vast array of circumstances. It might be a mistake to deny judges discretion to determine when attorneys need not go through certain standardized procedures. [Vol. 75
On the other hand, the vague standard of "reasonableness" provides very little guidance to attorneys and judges. Counsel will behave under their own notions of what is reasonable, and judges will apply their own personal conceptions about attorneys' duties to defendants. Thus, the Court is really setting no standard at all beyond the notion that counsel must provide competent legal assistance to the client.
The Court balanced these pros and cons of the "reasonableness" standard and opted for providing counsel with wide latitude in making strategic decisions about the case. 13 2 It may be right to provide attorneys with flexibility in making decisions about how to present the defense. But the Court could have strengthened its position if it had required some type of pretrial or pre-hearing supervision by the trial judge.
1 3 3 A judge easily could review the pretrial conduct of counsel at a pretrial conference and determine whether counsel has performed the necessary investigations.1 3 4 Before the trial or sentencing hearing begins, the judge can determine whether counsel acted "reasonably."'1 3 5 This procedure would alleviate the Court's fear of repeated litigation and overcrowded court dockets caused by post-trial ineffective assistance claims. The judge would review and remedy counsel's conduct before trial and would eliminate the possibility that the verdict would be reversed and a new trial required because of counsel's inadequate investigations.1 3 6 132 Id. 133 See Note, supra note 2, at 773-75. This supervision would be appropriate to ensure that counsel made reasonable investigations before a trial or sentencing hearing to uncover any information that would benefit the defense. The pretrial conference need not be limited to capital cases, although that is where it is most urgently needed. The trial court can use a pretrial conference in any criminal case to review the evidence and determine whether defense counsel made reasonable investigations. Such a procedure would be well worth the expenditure of resources. Claims of ineffective assistance are rapidly becoming popular amongjailhouse lawyers. See Tybor, Trial and Error: The Issue of Incompetent Legal Counsel, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1983, §4, at 1, col. 1.
134 The lawyer could give the judge a report on all the investigations that were made and whether the attorney followed all the leads that could uncover beneficial evidence. During the conference the trial judge can review the state's evidence to help determine whether defense counsel invested the necessary resources to provide competent representation.
135 Of course this procedure will only determine whether counsel made any errors before trial begins. Thejudge will be on hand to evaluate any errors made during trial. The judge at the pretrial conference can look at counsel's investigations of all the issues, including character evidence, and determine if the investigation was adequate under the circumstances.
136 If the judge determined that the attorney's report, see supra note 134, was unsatisfactory, he or she could grant a continuance and order investigations or further preparations for trial to be made. The trial judge could even discharge the defense counsel if the attorney is not willing to make the necessary preparations.
The Court failed to advocate a procedure whereby judges could detect and remedy attorney incompetence with the minimum amount of interference with attorney independence and jury verdicts.
Although the Court may have been correct in providing counsel wide latitude in preparing the defense in ordinary criminal cases, it was wrong in applying this same vague "reasonableness" standard in capital cases. The Court missed an opportunity to impose concrete standards for attorney competence in capital sentencing hearings. Because capital punishment sentencing proceedings are fundamentally different from any other type of criminal proceeding, 13 7 the Court could have carved out some basic standards to aid attorneys and judges in determining whether counsel's performance was reasonable. Despite the majority's contrary conclusion, 139 a capital sentencing hearing is different from an ordinary trial.14 0 The situations in a capital sentencing hearing are not so varied and complex that the establishment of rules would be counterproductive.' 4 1 A defense attorney must persuade the sentencing authority that a sentence of life is preferable and more appropriate than a sentence of death. This is done by exposing the "human" qualities of the defendant that mitigate the monstrous acts that the defendant committed.
14 3
For example, by presenting evidence that the defendant was abused as a child or that the defendant was acting under extraordinarily stressful circumstances, an attorney may persuade a sentencing authority that mercy is the appropriate response. 14 4 This mitigating "human" evidence can be obtained only by a thorough investigation into the defendant's life history.
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Because sentencing hearings typically involve similar elements, the Court could have adopted standards for effective assistance of counsel without impairing attorney independence. The standards for effective assistance in a capital sentencing hearing include: (1) thorough crime and life-history investigations in preparation for the sentencing hearing; and (2) presentation of all reasonably available mitigating evidence that would be helpful to the defendant.
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Although the Court easily could have established these standards, it ignored the differences between a capital sentencing hearing and other types of criminal proceedings. 14 7 Perhaps the Court did not want to carve out an exception for capital cases and create precedent for defendants in other types of cases to seek exceptions to its two-tiered rule. The Court expressed its fear of encouraging other defendants to bring ineffective assistance claims. 148 But, as argued above, the Court could have embraced pretrial procedures for determining counsel's reasonableness without prolonging the appellate process. 149 By failing even to address the notion of concrete standards for attorney conduct at a capital sentencing hearing, the Court unnecessarily limited the rights of criminal defendants. A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case, however, is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision. . . that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision. )). This sentence is the extent of the Court's discussion on the differences between a capital sentencing hearing and other criminal proceedings. The Court looked only at the sterile procedures of the sentencing hearing to determine its similarity to a regular criminal proceeding. It thus ignored the fundamental distinction between the types of punishment involved in the two proceedings. Justice Stewart has stated the distinction most clearly:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in the concept of humanity. The harmless error rule advocated here does not require a per se reversal once attorney incompetence is established. The state, however, would have to rebut the presumption that such incompetence rendered the process unfair by proving that the incompetence was only harmless error.' 5 7 Considering the importance of competent counsel to an effective defense, such a presumption is reasonable. The Court's presumption that attorney incompetence is harmless unless proved otherwise is counterintuitive. 5 8 Requiring the state to prove harmless error in capital cases is both an appropriate safeguard and a procedural protection consistent with previous decisions of the Court. In capital cases, the consequences of an erroneous judgment, for society and the de-fendant, are unparalleled. 159 A prisoner, later found to be innocent, cannot be released once the prisoner has been executed. 160 The state, therefore, should take all precautions to make certain that those defendants put to death are guilty beyond even a shadow of a reasonable doubt. Judges or juries also must reach the right sentencing decision because their sentence cannot be undone. By placing an onerous burden upon capital defendants, the Supreme Court created the potential for intolerable situations; defendants could be put to death because they did not have the resources to prove that counsel's incompetence prejudiced their defense. Thus, it is entirely reasonable and consistent with Supreme Court precedent to make an exception to the proposed harmless error rule in capital cases and make proof of attorney incompetence a per se reversible error. 16 1 If the Court did not wish to go this far, it at least should 159 Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2073 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160 Furthermore, the rule of law is undermined when an innocent man is put to death because the injustice can never be fully corrected.
161 See Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 350-52 (overwhelming importance of presenting mitigating evidence in capital case justifies per se reversal upon finding of defense attorney incompetence). The Constitution imposes special safeguards on the administration of capital punishment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (juries cannot have unfettered discretion in determining whether to impose death penalty). Capital punishment must be imposed with a greater degree of reliability than a noncapital sentence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (sentencers can not be prevented from considering mitigating evidence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentences for first degree murder are unconstitutional). Thus, it is entirely reasonable for the Court to provide a capital defendant with a greater guarantee of effective assistance to make certain that a death sentence is not imposed "in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See generally Comment, supra note 101, at 1545-49.
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Court struck down a death penalty statute that prevented the sentencer from considering mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant. When an attorney fails to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer, counsel is, in effect, preventing the sentencer from deliberating upon that evidence. Furthermore, the failure by a sentencer to consider mitigating evidence, in this situation because of attorney incompetence, can lead to a sentence that is arbitrary and capricious. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion). Defendants of similar culpability may not be treated similarly if defense attorneys fail to present necessary mitigating evidence in every case. Finally, the Court has stated that the death penalty can be imposed only if it is proportionate to the defendant's culpability. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) . When a defense attorney fails to represent the client adequately, the sentencer may be unaware of mitigating factors that may limit the defendant's culpability. Thus, an incompetent attorney may preclude a constitutional death sentence.
Other cases where the Court has found per se reversible error in ineffective assistance claims are not helpful here. Those cases support a finding of per se reversible error when the state has interfered with the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (absence of counsel at trial); Hamil-have required the state to prove harmless error in capital cases. 16 2 The greater protection for capital defendants is a logical extension of other procedural protections afforded to defendants facing the prospect of execution.
Although the Supreme Court made several errors in developing the standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court may have reached the right conclusion in this particular case. It is not clear whether counsel's actions in this case were unreasonable. He undoubtedly could and should have investigated the defendant's background. He had an obligation to overcome his "sense of helplessness" and search for any possible mitigating evidence. Counsel's failure even to meet with Washington's wife or mother 163 demonstrates a lack of thoroughness in his investigation.
Counsel's lack of thoroughness in investigating, however, does not necessarily indicate incompetence or apathy on his part. Counsel realized that any character testimony would be rebutted by the state's presentation of evidence about Washington's criminal background. Thus, Washington may not have been better off having the character testimony introduced. The standards of reasonable (1978) . These cases are distinguishable and have been forcefully distinguished by the courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1258-59. In Washington, the defendant was not totally deprived of counsel as was the defendant in Gideon. He did not claim that the state interfered with his relationship with his attorney as was the case in Geders. Finally, there is no evidence that the attorney was burdened by an actual conflict of interest as in Cuyler. Id. 162 The Court has often held that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly great when a life is at stake. The Court has prohibited procedures in capital cases that may have been accepted under ordinary circumstances. See, e.g. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (capital sentencing proceeding sufficiently similar to trial on guilt or innocence such that DoubleJeopardy clause prevents state from seeking greater penalty on retrial); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (may not impose death sentence where jury not permitted to consider verdict of guilt of lesser included non-capital offense); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (may not preclude sentencer from considering mitigating evidence in capital cases); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (may not impose death sentence based, in part, on information that defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence for first degree murder impermissible). Justice O'Connor has stated that the Court has taken great care to minimize the chance that a sentence of death is "imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) Of course, any analysis as to the probable effect of evidence that was never introduced is highly speculative. 165 One would feel much more comfortable with the verdict if counsel had made an exhaustive investigation and then decided to introduce no character evidence. Because counsel made such a cursory investigation, and because the consequences of an erroneous verdict are so great, the Court should have reversed and remanded the judgment for further proceedings. By doing so, the Court would have sent a signal to lawyers assisting capital defendants that the Constitution will not tolerate any cutting of corners in capital cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that claimants asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel must meet two burdens. First, the defendant must show that counsel's representation was unreasonable; second, the defendant must show that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense. The Court asserted that this test applied even when the defendant is facing a sentence of death. The two-tiered standard is unnecessary and unfair to the defendant. Once the defendant shows that the defense counsel was incompetent, the state should be required to prove that counsel's errors did not prejudice the defense. The Court's harsh ruling is aggravated by the fact that defendants facing a death sentence must also meet the dual burden. The Court could have developed concrete guidelines that counsel must follow in a capital sentencing hearing. It also could have embraced a pretrial hearing as a method of discovering and remedying attorney errors that occur before trial. The Court did not choose to take any innovative steps to ensure that defendant's receive adequate counsel at trial. Its failure to do so results in the further erosion of the rights of criminal defendants.
DAVID J. GROSS
164 See Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 351 (failure to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing hearing not inherently prejudicial where prosecution would present more aggravating case in rebuttal to particular mitigating evidence).
165 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
